Why did Tsar Nicholas II fail to maintain the regime during the February Revolution?
What was the standard of living of the population and serious prerequisites for the restructuring of consciousness against the regime? Where were the police, army, and special services?
By the time the October events began, Nicholas II had already signed his abdication and was under arrest by the Provisional Government, which was headed by the Social Democrat Kerensky.
By the time of the October Revolution, Nicholas was not a tsar, but a Romanov citizen.
However, the tsar could not contain the revolution even in February. This was due to the fact that Nikolai simply had no support. He was the most unpopular tsar in the history of our country. No joke – even the royal family didn't like him very much. He had no real forces, no real elites to rely on.
Imperialism-feudalism-leadership in all its forms was already losing out to capitalism at that time
The absolute monarchy, moreover, has already lost completely, the only chance the tsar had was if he stopped pushing his bullshit about autocracy. The leader is not Russia, he should serve the people and not rule! It is no longer profitable to obey the king, so his retinue betrayed him.
They threw off the king earlier, back in February, so the question of how he could have stayed in the October revolution can only give an answer about the author's personality )) I will not call the proper epithets due to the obvious, but the author definitely does not interfere with learning at school.
However, the personality of the king certainly played a role. an exemplary henpecked man, a disgusting manager, indecisive and even cowardly in general, totally unsuitable as a ruler who found himself in power at a turning point in history.
It is the historical clumsy role of all such stupid and cowardly Nikolais, Stalins, Brezhnevs, who surrounded themselves with an executive retinue unable to think independently-and led to the fact that Leadership in any form became a brake on progress, leading to the degradation of a nation that tolerates a Leader, a Ruler instead of a SERVANT of the people.
Nikolai could not create structures of control over the army-gendarmes-military-industrial complex factories, could not create a separation of branches of government known since ancient times, could not create a Single law, left vile privileges to all sorts of uslik, could not even organize a fight against revolutionary terrorists who were caught and exiled, ugh.
There were several reasons that simultaneously coincided. Let me first tell you a little bit about the reasons:
I. The first group of reasons: the social base of the monarchy and the reputational collapse.
1. The unpopularity of Nicholas II at the top of aristocratic society. In fact, because of the behavior of Alexandra Feodorovna, who spoiled relations with all the relatives of the tsar, they refused to communicate with him and his wife. In addition, the personal qualities of Nicholas II included, on the one hand, exposure to outside influences (the tsar could change his mind on any issue in fact at the last moment) and at the same time had a firm belief in unlimited autocratic power. It was this combination of qualities (and to me an imaginary “weak will”) that determined that the tsar was, alas, “no” leader. He knew himself that he was not ready to reign, but years and habit had strengthened his stubbornness and lack of desire to consult anyone but his wife. The aristocrats of the” upper class ” knew about these features of the tsar and despised him for it (including, in fact, his own mother, who hated Alexandra Feodorovna). By the way, Alexandra Feodorovna was just a bright charismatic and could well be able to manage the state, but alas, she was a woman. Inability to govern, poor knowledge of Russia (she was German), blind trust in Nicholas II (she adored her husband), and at the same time advice (which was absolutely irresponsible, since the tsarina did not see any results or bear any responsibility in giving it) made Alexandra Feodorovna (an intelligent and sensitive woman) essentially the “evil genius of the throne” even before Rasputin. I would even say that it was not Rasputin who manipulated the tsarina, but she was manipulated by Rasputin (who, by the way, respected her). In general, the fatal inability of people who are essentially excellent in their personal qualities (not for nothing were they canonized as passion-bearers by the Church) and their alienation from the family – this is the first reason.
2. The growth of bureaucratic dominance. The upper and middle-level bureaucracy was burdened by the fact that a certain “controller” in the form of a tsar was standing over it. The very problem of bureaucratic “alienation of power” under the monarchy was described by monarchist theorists themselves (see L. A. Tikhomirov “Monarchical Statehood”, 1905). After the Decembrist uprising, Nicholas I essentially followed the path of” emancipation ” of the throne from the well-born nobility and relying on bureaucratic nominees. This necessary measure over time (in the absence of a counterweight to the bureaucracy in the form of an elected body) led to the complication of the state apparatus, an increase in bribery and favoritism (and intrigue), and most importantly generated discontent in the lower and middle levels of the bureaucracy, which for years were denied promotion within the framework of the strategy (let them serve longer first, and then the nobility will receive). In fact, by 1905, the entire lower part of the bureaucracy had come to the conclusion that deep reforms were necessary and that autocracy should be abandoned. Then it simply began to partly revolutionize, partly lose interest in independent decisions, suffer from passivity and inertia. In fact, they could not and/or did not want to provide any support to Nicholas II.
3. Westernism of the “enlightened nobility” and “capitalists”. Most of the nobility, in the context of the rise of the revolutionary movement and as they perceived (with enthusiasm) the new Western trends, gradually took on two possible positions (generally loyal to the throne): 1) Conservative Westerners, who in fact advocated a strong government that should protect their land and property privileges. This group disliked Nicholas II, whom they considered “weak” since the first Russian Revolution of 1905. Only a minority of them (like Stolypin) tried to reform something within the old system (in fact, there is a version that this group eliminated Stolypin in order to further weaken the power of Nicholas II). 2) Liberal nobles (constitutional cadets, zemstvos, etc.). The liberal part of the nobility was entirely in favor of progressive reforms, the tsar's abdication from power, and the cadets even supported (for tactical reasons) the revolutionary terror of the left parties. Thus, the throne (represented by Nicholas II) could not receive support from the nobility either. In principle, the same position was taken by large industrialists.
4. The situation of the mass of workers and peasants. The intelligentsia. Growth of revolutionary sentiments. Contrary to modern historical myths spread by the media, most peasants or nobles were no longer pro-monarchist by 1917. Already with Con. XIX century-the beginning. In the twentieth century, the discontent of the peasantry gradually grows, which after the counter-reforms of Alexander III (zemstvo bosses, tightening of land policy, the need to pay ransom payments). Since 1902, the revolutionary ferment begins (reinforced by propaganda of the narodnik movement), which was expressed in pogroms and the destruction of landowners ' estates, which in 1905 essentially develops into full-fledged peasant uprisings throughout the country (in school they usually taught about “Bloody Sunday”, Krasnaya Presnya, but they did not say that the main events of the 1905 revolution took place in the countryside. Industrialization (which began at the same time) in fact, it forced the tsarist government to increase pressure on the peasantry. The abolition of ransom payments was accompanied by the Stolypin reform (which, having destroyed the community, did not offer anything instead, and the scourge of the peasants remained hunger and lack of land). In general, back in 1905, there was such a demonstrative ditty among the peasants (terrible for the authorities): “There is no God, the Tsar is not needed, we will kill the Governor, we will not pay taxes, we will not go to the soldiers.” In 1914, a new misfortune came for the peasants – the war, which the peasants initially perceived patriotically. But after a few years, the nature of the war (a terrible positional meat grinder with an acute shortage of ammunition) and old resentments against the monarchical system led to increased desertions from the army. The peasants were tired of the war and did not understand what they were fighting for. As for the workers, the workers were in an even more terrible situation than the peasants. The notes and articles of monarchist authors, as well as the reports of gendarmes, draw workers from the beginning. Twentieth century as a poor, ragged and embittered crowd, living in hellish conditions (in crowding and stinking earthen barracks) and receiving a “salary” mainly 2-3 times a year “for the holidays”. The cost of living in the barracks, daily food and fines were deducted from the workers ' salaries. They were fined for everything – for a 5-minute break to go to the toilet or smoke, for daring to say a word with a neighbor, for a sideways glance thrown at the master. It is not surprising that it was the workers who became the core of the revolutionary actions of 1905. After the” winning back ” in 1907, the situation of the workers worsened even more. As for the intelligentsia, there is nothing to say. The entire intelligentsia, for the most part, traced its ideological lineage back to the enlighteners of the eighteenth century and the Decembrists of the nineteenth..
Thus, by 1917, the tsar had lost his footing in all significant social strata – the upper aristocracy, the middle and lower levels of the bureaucracy, the nobility, the merchants (“industrialists”), the intelligentsia, and the broad masses of workers and peasants. The tsar still had the support of small merchants and petty bourgeoisie (which comprised the so-called “monarchist parties”) and the higher bureaucracy (which depended on the tsar). Other reasons were socio-economic reasons, namely:
II. The second group of reasons is socio-economic and technological changes.
1. The decline of the estate society. Already in the nineteenth century, the class system began to gradually disintegrate, in the form of the collapse of a powerful internal dependence between the nobility and the peasantry – serfdom (1861). In addition, non – genealogical groups began to appear-various revolutionary intelligentsia, university environment, and so on. With the growth of pauperization of peasants and workers, the “people of the bottom”, all sorts of “chelkash”, boatmen, homeless people, and so on multiplied. Two centuries of liberal-enlightenment propaganda led to the secularization of society and the emergence of religious sectarianism (shtunda, Old Believers, folk pagan sects), all sectarians naturally did not belong to any class anymore.
2. The beginning of industrialization. The problem of agricultural overpopulation. Industrialization began in the last third of the nineteenth century and rapidly gained momentum. The problem was that the Russian Empire had no colonies and a new spurt of development was carried out due to the growth of “pressure” on the peasantry. This has led to an aggravation of the problem of agricultural overpopulation. The essence of the problem is as follows: the peasantry became too numerous and did not have enough land. At the same time, labor productivity itself and the amount of agricultural product produced were low, because the industrial sector in the Russian Empire was in no way connected with the agricultural sector. Simply put, industrial innovations did not arrive in the village and the peasants continued to use the plow, plow, harrow, and so on. This led to an increasingly frequent peasant famine – government measures helped to alleviate it somewhat. In total, 36 (!!) large and small “hunger strikes” of peasants took place in the nineteenth century. No one counted how many peasants and peasant children died during this time. A huge number of children of poor, landless and landless peasants simply did not live to adulthood, dying from a banal decrease in immunity (that is, “underfed”). All this happened not because of the ill will of individuals, but because the old social order did not meet the new needs of people. By the way, this problem (looking ahead) will be finally solved only after the Second (!!) World War, when mineral fertilizers will be added to collective farms and tractors and the problem of mass starvation of peasants will finally disappear (before that, this problem has yet to cause three terrible famines of 1921-22, 1932-33, 1946-47, which in their intensity will eclipse the famines of the XIX century).
3. The development of capitalist relations and the growth of conflict in society. At the same time, the capitalist system will begin to grow (since 1861). The country will gradually become stratified according to the criterion of the presence or absence of ownership of the means of production, and the instrument of this will be a new force – property-money (and not class) inequality. All this will lead to the aggravation of conflicts between the aristocracy and the bureaucracy (for influence on the tsarist throne), between the nobility and the emerging bourgeoisie (the bourgeoisie will insist on the development of industry, the nobility will point out the growth of agricultural problems, the bourgeoisie will also want to become a privileged stratum, the nobility will resist this), between the peasantry and the state-bureaucratic apparatus (see above), between regional ethnoses and the “indigenous” (Russian) ethnos. At first, these will be “cold” conflicts, but soon they will develop into hot ones and the abdication of Nicholas II will become a prelude to a more terrible tragedy – the civil war.
III. The last group of reasons is organizational and political.
1. Unfavorable course of wars and the nature of the First World War (from 1904 to 1917). For the Russian Empire, the Crimean War (1853-56) was already the “first bell” in a series of military conflicts where the Russian Empire was essentially the losing side (this can include the Russo-Japanese and World War I). The last war generally buried the old statehood. The reason for this was not only technological backwardness or low legitimacy. The very nature of the First World War is a long positional war with senseless, terrible attacks in the forehead, a large number of losses, and stagnation of the front lines… This is the kind of war that humanity has never known before or since. To keep the faith in victory required simply fanaticism, frenzied irrational faith (and from all-from soldiers and officers. Here it is also necessary to take into account that the most monarchically minded units (including officers) were 70% destroyed in the campaigns of 1914-1915, suffering heavy losses. This objectively reduced the chances of the monarchy to survive (although I think that the monarchy has not had a chance since 1905, and the conservative monarchist K. N. Leontiev back in the XIX century. he wrote “we need a new socialist Constantine”, that is, we need a tsar who, just as Constantine once “introduced” Christianity into the fabric of the empire, will also introduce socialism from above (and then the monarchy is saved.))
2. The emergence of alternative statehood sprouts. The State Duma and Soviets. In fact, since the beginning of the twentieth century, the “sprouts” of alternative statehood, the movement of zemstvos (thoroughly liberal), revolutionary parties (which conduct free educational and educational work among their members, have their own legal proceedings for resolving disputes, and even their own tribunal, prosecutors, lawyers and executioners-like the revolutionary fighting organization of the Social Revolutionaries), as well as the State Duma (the first Russian parliament) and Soviets (the first form of revolutionary organization) that emerged in 1905. The Soviets were suppressed, and after 1907 the Duma turned into an ordinary liberal-conservative “talking shop”, but already the events of February 1917 showed that the Duma members were able to organize and create a Provisional Government (relying on the right-wing bourgeois and cadet parties), and the rebellious “street” in the form of workers and soldiers quickly nominated deputies to the Soviets (relying on the revolutionary parties). Thus, since 1905, the monarchy had a “gravedigger” next to it in the form of both legal (Duma, Zemstvo, party) and illegal (combat organizations, squads) organizations.
Well, you basically understood my point. Under these conditions, as soon as the crisis matured (and in 1917 it was even “overripe”), the Duma members and tsarist generals essentially betrayed the monarch (and monarchist deputies-Guchkov and Shulgin-went to “repudiate” Nicholas II), and the revolutionary parties organized the Petrograd Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies. Nicholas II was already essentially unable to do anything. The masses of people in the streets rejoiced at the abdication. The very abdication of Nicholas II (on his part it was a heroic attempt to save the monarchy) did not lead to anything, because Mikhail Romanov also abdicated (which caused a sharply negative reaction from Nicholas II, by the way). After the abdication of Mikhail Romanov, this act of tragedy called “The Russian Empire is being destroyed” was completed. The last tsar of the Romanov family was the namesake of the first tsar. The oath of the Zemsky Sobor of 1613 was violated by both sides-both the dynasty and the people (and by the way, it was rejected by the Synod of the Orthodox Church). The Russian Empire has fallen into historical oblivion. A completely new Russia was being born, but before it appeared, there were still 5 years of a fierce “war of all against all”. Something like that.