2 Answers

  1. Edmund Husserl, the philosopher and founding father of phenomenology, was a student ofBrentano. In the development of his ideas, he relied on the works ofNietzsche and his teacher, in particular the idea ofBrentano on the intentionality of things.

    Brentano was the first to point out that psychological processes such as memory and attention are poorly described, so he initially took a descriptive approach rather than an analytical one.

    Franz Brentano: “Wait to create theories, let's take a look at the phenomena!”

    Many centuries ago, philosophers wondered – What is the truth?

    Husserl put another question – What's the point?

    So how do I know the world?

    How is the subjective meaning and knowledge of things formed for me?

    How is the essence of things constituted in my mind?

    Husserl's phenomenology is the phenomenology of consciousness, according to which interest and attention are directed to what is contained in perception, and what this perception is. He was interested in the question, – Who is the phenomenon? – response – Consciousness. PhenomenologyHusserl's theory explored how things are presented to consciousness.

    Based on the sloganGetteBack to the things themselves!”,Husserl “says” – forget pragmatic goals, remove all intentions, put aside all theories and just look at the things themselves.

    According toAccording to Husserl, the essence of things can appear only in relations with the world. If a relationship arises between me and something or someone, only then is it possible to discover the essence of things. Objects do not exist outside of their perception by consciousness, that is, phenomena depend on the subject, and consciousness is the space in which phenomena appear.

    Cognition of the essence of things is carried out through subjective cognition.

    Husserl: “The essence is something that you will not confuse this thing with another”

    It is impossible to clear phenomena of subjectivity, that is, to completely remove oneself from the brackets, to remove the subjective factor. Therefore, he suggested that this factor should be dissected by dividing perception into

    • superficial (first impression received through the senses) and
    • deep (spiritual vision) or phenomenological perception, which includes intuition, one's own feelings, and understanding of relationships.

    Thus, a person's gaze is simultaneously directed at the surface, that is, the phenomenon, and at the essence (depth) of this phenomenon.

    Husserl also introduced two concepts-NOEMA and NOESIS.

    Noema is the first impression, which should be treated with a certain amount of healthy doubt. You can't be gullible, taking the first impression for the point. It's good to question something. What was it really like?

    Noesis is how an impression was formed in me; how I came to understand this essence.

    Through Noesis, I can confirm or deny Noema. Through the analysis of Noesis, the essence of things is revealed and the ability to change them by questioning them.

    Here, in brief, is the main point in the phenomenology of consciousness by E. A. Kropotkin. Husserl.

  2. The essence of phenomenology is the study of directly given subjective phenomenal experience in isolation from all the presuppositions and referential connections that it implies that relate to extra-mental reality. This state of suspension of judgment is called “epoch”. Unlike the phenomenalists (Berkeley, Mill, etc.), Husserl of the “Ideas I” period did not claim that the only reality is the reality of phenomena, but assumed the existence of an objective world. But he believed that the first task of philosophy is to investigate the information directly given to us in our minds. This immanent perception – access to one's subjective mental acts and states – is the subject of phenomenology research. It is obviously true and differs from the transcendental perception, which is accessible only indirectly and can be false-memory, “objective” things and events. Immanent perception is a necessary foundation for transcendent perception, and hence for all other areas of philosophy and science. Therefore, phenomenology is the most basic of all disciplines. It is easy to see that Husserl's methodology (phenomenological reduction) is very similar to Descartes ' “methodological doubt”.

    Basically, you can read this in any textbook. For some reason, textbooks rarely pay attention to Husserl's path from Cartesian dualism in the early phenomenological period (someone called Husserl the last great philosopher in the Cartesian tradition) to transcendent idealism. To put it simply, he reasoned something like this. Consciousness is a part of the world and is conditioned by objective physical causes. However, if we do not want to postulate, as Kant did, an unknowable world of “things-in-themselves,” we must admit that the objective world itself is created by consciousness. But if the consciousness that created the world also created our ordinary psychological consciousness, then the whole world is constituted by one of its elements, human consciousness. Husserl found a solution to this paradox in considering the consciousness that created the world not as a part of this world, but as a transcendent one.

    The world created by the transcendent consciousness is shaped not only by our experience, but also by the culture and perceptions of the world in which we live. Husserl called it the Lebenswelt (inhabited world). The inhabited world is, roughly speaking, something like an unexplored existence, which is the basis for all ideas, judgments, hypotheses and proofs. Culture, science and other human practices are based on it, but the world itself is constantly changing due to the development and change of these practices.

    If we compare Husserl's early (Cartesian) and late phenomenology, we get an amazing picture.

    There is still a point with the terminology. Because of not very good definitions in some textbooks, it is sometimes not very well understood, although there is nothing terrible there. The central concept is intentionality, which Husserl borrowed from his teacher Brentano. The intentionality of a mental act is its being “about something”, “content”, orientation to an object. This is called the matter of the act, meaning, or, in later works, “noema.” The signification of a mental object occurs by the act of signification (Meinen – there are two types of them, one signifies a word, the other a proposition).

    Every mental act belongs to a particular kind, which is determined by its matter. For example, all thoughts about potatoes belong to the same species. If someone makes the proposition that “potatoes taste better than apples,” the meaning of this proposition is the kind to which all acts of such a judgment belong. If A makes a judgment “C” and B agrees with A, then their judgments are two different mental acts, but they belong to the same species, because they have the same matter. In later works, Husserl referred to the individual mental act as ” noesis.”

    Acts also have qualities. For example, the acts of seeing potatoes, imagining potatoes, and wishing potatoes have the same matter, potatoes, but “seeing”, “imagining”, and “wishing” are different things, so the acts differ in quality.

    Husserl did a great deal of work carefully developing the theory of intentionality, but its central question – how signification occurs and how it is possible-remains unresolved and one of the most interesting in modern philosophy (especially the philosophy of consciousness) and science.

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