- Why did everyone start to hate the Russians if the U.S. did the same thing in Afghanistan, Iraq?
- What needs to be corrected in the management of Russia first?
- Why did Blaise Pascal become a religious man at the end of his life?
- How do I know if a guy likes you?
- When they say "one generation", how many do they mean?
Oddly enough, it is to understand whether we can really understand how the world works, to what extent and to what extent. Further, the question becomes more nuanced with the clarification of what we can and cannot learn, what should be considered true knowledge, what tools of knowledge we use and how effective they are.
We can say that a certain set of answers to questions about the cognizability of the world is a starting point, both for self-development, etc., and for various intellectual directions. For example, in science, it is difficult without epistemological optimism.
Actually, we can roughly distinguish three main answers to the question of cognizability of the world. Epistemological optimism (the world is ultimately knowable), agnosticism (it is not known whether it is knowable or not), and pessimism (the world is ultimately unknowable).
The point is that any philosopher wants to consider his worldview correct and that his theoretical construction is developed by the right tool, and the tool is his own thinking. That is, the entire act of knowledge must be objective. Therefore, any philosophy is forced to engage in epistemology. Especially substantial philosophy, which deals with the invisible, intelligible world.
For example: the theory of reflection, in the teachings of the French enlighteners and taken up by dialectical materialism … demonstrates unresolved questions in the relationship between thinking and the object, when thinking is presented as a given and not defined by a concept. Their condition: “Consciousness is the property of highly organized matter to reflect matter” – not disclosed. Only historical and metaphysical assurances. But consciousness cannot distinguish itself from the object if it does not have its own definiteness in itself. And if nature is reflected in itself, then tell me how it reaches the formation of consciousness, appears in the form of consciousness and as consciousness. After such a startling folly, the very ideas of the materialists themselves become very dubious.
The point is that Wittgenstein, Mamardashvili, and others like Snimi argued that lingua cannot describe the world and a person's place in it. Fortunately or unfortunately, this is not the case.
The point is: is it possible to be in the world, being created by the laws of the world, to know (see) the whole world from within the world?
My answer is that you can. I argue that man is able not only to feel the world around him and use it to his advantage, as animals do, but also to move the structure of the external world into himself, into his consciousness, knowing its laws.
We build a world within ourselves, within our thinking, and the more the structure of the laws of the universe coincides with the structure of the laws that are arranged in the external world, in relation to consciousness, the more accurately we can predict the world, both at an unattainable distance from us, and in time.
Thus, rewinding time along the time axis, moving according to the formula of the world that we know, we came to the point of its origin-13.8 billion years. We can also “see” the world in the future. And the more knowledge you have, the more accurate your predictions will be. And the main feature that allows us to do this is the ability to create an image of the world inside our consciousness. We use scientific knowledge like puzzles and integrate it into our world structure.
For the scientist, the world is known as the initial state. Philosophers, on the other hand, find out the foundations of cognizability of the world (and the foundations of science). And these grounds are transcendental (or, they cannot be clarified by research procedures). Thus, the world of the absurd (the absence of the space of understanding, the destruction of the space of meaning by one's thought) is unknowable. It can be ridiculed and described (Kafka's world), but it is not permeable to understanding.
Personally, the closest thing to me is the Rastafarian approach to cognizability of the world.
I don't care how much we know the world in principle, ideally, in theory. It is best for each of us to know it to the maximum extent that is still practical for him personally. This means that all of humanity should learn more and more about it – as far as possible.
The point is simply that knowing this world (since it is our home and prison) gives us an undeniable competitive advantage over anyone who ignores this knowledge. Whether we are talking about individuals (individual selection), nations (population selection), or entire intelligent species.
How did the ancient philosophers see the question of the knowability of the world? – They saw the world either as an ideal divine creation, whose complexity (or even fundamental incomprehensibility) is explained by our insignificance before the divine mind. Or a kind of battleground between the principle of order and primordial Chaos, as a rule-an island of order in the ocean of chaos. And here the question of the knowability of the world could seem fundamental – and even practical.
At our level, the world looks more like an operating system (an operating system on a computer), which we have to use because writing a new one is no longer a task for one person, and using a small, incompatible one means not being able to use most of the software written by people – from business to games.
Therefore-Windows and only Windows. It was written by thousands of coders. It went through many versions, inheriting bugs and bug patches. It is “inscrutable” precisely and exclusively in this sense. It is important for both hackers and those who struggle with them to study and describe its smallest bugs and features.
Well, modern “vintages” of Linux-although better open source, but otherwise-the same p…nya, profile view.