3 Answers

  1. I have no doubt that there will be professional philosophers who will give a concrete answer from the standpoint of their worldview. I will indicate my own thoughts in this direction as if in the margins.

    Philosophy is generally a worldview. Materialistic philosophy is a materialistic worldview, religious philosophy is theological, and esoteric philosophy is completely different.

    Philosophy-we read in the Wiki – is understood ( materialistic-approx. the author of the text) by philosophers as a critical understanding of the world, a person, the experience of being a person in the world, as a type of social consciousness and knowledge of the world, developing a system of ideas and knowledge about the foundations of being a person in the world.

    Everything seems to be clear and without artifacts. But this is at first glance. Philosophy does not “solve paradoxes” because it does not recognize their existence. But various disputes and discrepancies abound.

    Take, for example, the concept of “subjective reality.”

    There is an eternal debate about this concept: “reductionism” and “anti-reductionism”, “physicalism” and “functionalism”.

    What is the reason for these disputes? What is the stumbling block of philosophy ( materialistic) in its attempt to know being?

    The reason is an incorrect, erroneous and for this reason dead-end worldview. Esoteric philosophy knows no paradoxes, because they do not exist for it. A paradox for intelligence arises when the actual worldview is unable to explain the phenomenon.

    How can such a paradox be solved other than by changing the worldview?

    Materialistic philosophers are not going to do this, and for this reason their philosophy is not able to solve the paradoxes that arise from its limitations.

  2. What modern philosophy do you write about, where did you see it, and what modern philosophers can you name and what they discovered? All modern philosophers study the works of ancient sages and consider themselves experts in their works, and themselves “pseudo-philosophers”…If people stop being wise and stop being smart, the benefits of x will increase a hundredfold. If people stop feeling sorry for each other and give up their desire for justice, they can return to honoring their parents and loving each other. If people stop trying to cheat and profit, thieves and robbers will disappear by themselves.”Lao Tzu. With respect.

  3. In the philosophy of consciousness that interests me, there are the following paradoxes, which, alas, have not received either a scientific or a conceptual (philosophical) solution.
    1) Inverted spectrum. For the first time, D. Locke thought about this. Consider two people who react to colors in the same way: they call them correctly, cross the road to green instead of red, and so on. Do these people experience the same feelings in color perception? Let's say that person 1 feels red in the same way that person 2 feels green, and vice versa: green is like red. Sensations can also be “interfered with” in more complex ways: for example,” rearrange ” three, six… all parts of the spectrum. (It is important that we are talking about sensations, and not electric-mag. waves, the impact of which caused the sensation of a particular color)
    Outwardly, it seems impossible to detect this: both people will react correctly to traffic lights, and both people can agree on names for flowers…
    The sensations are private, so you can't compare the sensations. There are different approaches to solving this riddle: from “Yes, it is, qualia can be all people are different” (dualism, for example), to “untestable/nefalsifitsiruemaya/non-verified, then it is meaningless to talk about it” (ostensibly scientific way to shrug off the problem), and even “no feelings no” (eliminative materialism), etc.
    What is the answer? We will only know when the “explanatory gap” in the problem of the relationship between consciousness and body will be overcome.

    2) The explanatory gap, as the philosopher Levin called it. So far, no scientific or philosophical theory has been developed in which the existence of phenomenal consciousness follows from processes in the nervous system. Scientists know neurocorrelates: for example, that when such and such a zone of the cerebral cortex is activated, such and such sensations arise. It seems that along with the physical world, there is a world, or rather, a set of individual psychic worlds-phenomenal consciousnesses
    In special relativity, for example, there is the twin paradox. However, the” picture of the world ” of each of the twins is logically and mathematically derived from the SRT. To this day, the sciences of consciousness have not developed a theory that explains the dualism of the psychic and the physical. Even worse, there is reason to believe that functionalism implicitly accepted in science is fundamentally unable to bridge this gap in explanation – this is a difficult problem of consciousness
    3) The difficult problem of consciousness is voiced by D. Chalmers. The problem is simple
    functionalist neuroscience and psychology are able to describe/explain only those types of mental activity that are reduced to functional or causal relationships. For example, human behavior can be reduced to a functional diagram:
    – psychologically: desire / emotions are the causes of actions;
    – neurophysiologically: arousal of motor centers is the cause of actions.
    And similar.
    Phenomenal consciousness, in particular sensations, cannot be reduced to its function, because these are not functions, but events, states. In the example above, desire/emotion is not limited to its function of being the causes of behavior. After all, desire can be conscious, but actions can't be performed.
    It seems, well, what's the big deal? And the fact that along with the physical world, there is supposedly a correlating world of the psychic, located in an unknown place, which does not have any physical characteristics (mass, coordinates, etc.). It is impossible to reduce one to the other (see the thought experiment “Maria's room”). And it turns out that science implicitly admits the existence of the soul!
    In the context of the difficult problem of consciousness and the gap in explanation, phenomenal consciousness seems to be an unnecessary epiphenomenon, it seems that it can be dispensed with. And this leads to new problems.
    4) The philosophical zombie and the problem of other minds
    The fact that nervous processes and human behavior are accompanied by subjective experience: sensations, thoughts, emotions, scientists know only from the words of subjects and reactions. In fact, scientists take the observed people at their word and assume (but don't know for sure) that if the observed person behaves the same way as the observer, then they experience the same experiences (similar to an inverted spectrum, right?).
    Each of us faces this problem of other minds: I can't “look into the head” of another person, I just believe that he feels something too.
    The radical assumption that there may be philosophical zombies who, with the same nervous processes, the same reactions and words, do not experience anything (they have “dark inside”, as Chalmers put it). A zombie can be designed to say, “I feel pain,” but not to feel pain.
    Despite the fact that I am convinced that it is impossible to function as a person and not have a human subjective experience, these problems can't deal, because (see above), the gap in the explanation does not overcome
    P.S. I hope to get angry comments from scientists and experts on the topic. And I really hope that at least someone will explain how the psyche arises from the physical

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