4 Answers

  1. They say that enlighteners are good because they can tell simply about complex things, and philosophers are bad because they try to tell difficult things about simple phenomena. One of the champions in this field is Edmund Husserl, with his phenomenology-terms that are so far from the usual semantics (especially in Russian translation) they are wound up to explain what has become commonplace and commonplace in the computer age. It can be hated for just using the word phenomenon in the opposite sense of natural science.

  2. Seren Kierkegaard.

    He puts his thoughts in such a way that you can easily understand that he is a philosopher, and you are a fool, and in no way vice versa. And in the modern world, overloaded with information, you need to express yourself in an accessible and concise way.

    Don't be like Seren.

  3. Nietzsche.

    1. As a convinced rationalist, skeptic and realist, I have a very negative attitude towards metaphysical reasoning. I find them absolutely useless excesses, and any statements in this area are not provable and at best not refutable. Knowledge of the primary nature of reality is only meaningful if it enables you to make new, clear predictions, and if possible, you need to get rid of those aspects of knowledge without which the prediction will not change.�

    An example explaining their general uselessness:

    It makes no difference whether the apple fell on Newton's head because God willed it, fate ordered it, or something else. It is much more important in this example to study the reason for the fall of an apple, knowledge of which will allow you to predict whether apples will fall further. Maybe this apple was pruned by a sparrow and therefore fell, which means you just need to kick the tree well(so that all the pruned apples fall) in order to prevent further falls on the head of the poor thinker. Metaphysics, on the other hand, is usually incapable of anything like this, and in principle does not strive to be capable of it. �

    An example explaining their unprovability:

    Let's imagine the following situation. A certain person drops apples from the top and we are basically not able to see him. The metaphysician, as he should, will get to the “essence of the phenomenon”, regardless of whether this will be at least some benefit from knowing this “essence”. Namely, he will talk about whether he is black ,whether he is a communist, whether he is a good person, and similar questions. It will offer approximately models of reality : “a black communist throws apples” � “a white conservative throws apples” each of which gives the same predictions(apples fall from a tree), and therefore I will not be able to rationally prove that he is a black communist and I will not be able to refute this either. Since all I know is that apples keep falling, which is consistent with the predictions of both models.

    I will describe other reasons later because there are urgent cases.

  4. My least favorite philosopher is Theo Ohm. I hate it, I hate theomism, I hate the theory of potentiality, fundamental ontological agreement, epistemological neutrality, that's all. However, everything is not as simple as it seems. Everything is not as clear as it seems. Everything is not what it seems. Don't forget that.

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