- Why did everyone start to hate the Russians if the U.S. did the same thing in Afghanistan, Iraq?
- What needs to be corrected in the management of Russia first?
- Why did Blaise Pascal become a religious man at the end of his life?
- How do I know if a guy likes you?
- When they say "one generation", how many do they mean?
The existence, nature, and a General definition of such concepts as free will — the question is whether, even beyond the science, as to confirm or refute the concept of freedom of will need access to alternative realities (whether the person in the same circumstances to do otherwise) that seem impossible, so self-respecting science through the question of free will does not and should not — except indirectly. However, philosophy is interested in free will.
Philosophical schools give several answers to the question of free will:
Everything is strictly tied to the laws of nature, one of which is the existence of free will. However, compatibilists interpret free will specifically: will is the last desire before action. Thus, they only misrepresent the definition of “free” will in the universal predestination. In addition, there are many arguments against classical and modern compatibilism that you can come up with yourself: what if the last wish was imposed by a manipulator, what if we are remotely controlled by someone, what if we were programmed for this desire, what if I was brainwashed as a child, and what if I'm just a fool… In my opinion, compatibilism is devoid of logic and is based on a perversion of concepts.
Since everything is rigidly tied to the laws of nature and every consequence follows from the sum of the previous ones, free will is impossible, since every decision we make is conditioned by rigidly fixed neurochemical reactions in response to external stimuli that have arisen due to strictly defined reasons.
In my opinion, incompatibilism in determinism is one of the most sensible approaches to answering the question of free will. However, it is unacceptable to me, because if everything is predetermined and there is no free will, there is no moral responsibility: if a person cannot choose, then there is nothing to punish him or thank him for: the criminal committed the crime not because he was drawn to evil, but could have done otherwise, but because he simply could not do otherwise — so why punish him? — or did the philanthropist do good deeds not because he was burdened by them, but could have done otherwise, but because he simply could not do otherwise — so what is there to thank him for? The world without free will is empty for me, so I will never accept this concept.
Logically… But this is adequate only to the world in which the laws of nature imply non-definiteness, whereas our world is quite strictly subject to the laws of nature and even the behavior of turbulent flows, elementary particles and waves can be predicted. In my opinion, libertarianism is inadequate and based on a false premise (I think this word is cursed).
A complex, but even more logical concept than libertarianism. If nothing determines my choice, it does not mean that it is free, it only means that it is random. If there are equal alternative outcomes, then the choice always occurs randomly, regardless of the person's will to do so. However, rigid incompatibilism is based on the same premise as libertarianism, and therefore I consider it just as inadequate.
Thus, I am not satisfied with any of the four approaches to the question of predestination and free will. Indeterminism is too categorical, just as determinism is too categorical, and both of them are either incompatible with free will, or they do not fully argue for this compatibility. For me, the answer is the latter approach to the question of free will in a predetermined world.
The laws of nature determine the list of possible outcomes of any event and assign probabilities to them, but they do not determine which outcome will occur. Free will in the conditions of probabilistic predestination acts as a decisive, active factor in choosing the outcome in opposition to passive randomness. Just as the programmers of neural networks define the mechanism for obtaining results by it, and not these results, nature sets the mechanism for choosing an outcome from a set of possible ones, but not a single outcome. This concept is closest to me. It is complete, logical, adequate, internally and externally consistent.
It may be objected that there is no freedom of will where randomness takes place, and why is it suddenly opposed to it, if it is a part of it? Emergence! Individual trees are not forests, clusters of cells are not complex organisms, soil components are not fertile in themselves, and the gears of a clock do not show time by themselves. Emergence is a special property of complex systems to give rise to special properties that are not peculiar to its individual elements. All life is emergent, and the property of systems to be emergent is the main source of the fight against entropy. So what prevents consciousness as a complex system from giving birth to a new property: free will?
It is important to note that probabilism is quite consistent with current scientific observations and our knowledge of the quantum nature of the universe. However, this strongly depends on the interpretation of quantum entanglement, but at least there are interpretations that do not contradict this concept and are consistent in themselves.
Probabilism gives rise to several other conclusions, in addition to the conclusion about the validity of the concept of free will. But the most important thing that gives us probabilism is moral responsibility. If free will is possible and a person is free to overcome randomness, he can justly be punished and rewarded, praised and belittled.